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ALIGNING SHAREHOLDER VOTING 
AND SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT
Christoph Van der Elst
1. INTRODUCTION
With the first Shareholder Rights Directive of 2007 (hereinafter: SRD I), the 
European Commission facilitated shareholder voting as a tool for improving 
corporate governance. Recital 3 of the Directive provided: ‘Holders of shares 
carrying voting rights should be able to exercise those rights given that they 
are reflected in the price that has to be paid at the acquisition of the shares. 
Furthermore, effective shareholder control is a prerequisite to sound corporate 
governance and should, therefore, be facilitated and encouraged.’1 Obstacles 
deterring shareholders from voting and the exercise of voting rights without 
physically attending the general meeting, in particular for non-resident 
shareholders, were to be removed.2 Furthermore, limitations and constraints 
which make proxy voting cumbersome and costly had to be abolished.3 SRD I 
also emphasised the role of electronic voting for enabling shareholders to vote at 
general meetings. Article 8 of SRD I compelled all European Member States to 
provide the shareholders with general meeting participation rights consisting of 
real-time transmission, real-time two-way communication and/or ‘a mechanism 
for casting votes, whether before or during the general meeting, without the need 
to appoint a proxy holder who is physically present at the meeting.’ According to 
the directive, the latter way of participation must only be subject to requirements 
and constraints necessary to ensure the identification of shareholders and the 
security of the electronic communication.
In the second Shareholder Rights Directive of 20174, the European 
Commission further developed the relationship between shareholders and their 
1 Recital 3 Directive 2007/36/EC of 11 July 207 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies [2007] OJ L184/17.
2 Ibid. Recital 5.
3 Ibid. Recital 10.
4 Directive (EU) 2017/828 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17  May 2017 
amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder 
engagement [2017] OJ L132/60 (hereinafter SRD II).
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investees. Whilst SRD I facilitated the relationship between companies and its 
shareholders, SRD II emphasised the need to further strengthen and develop this 
relationship. The European Commission considered the shareholder engagement 
of institutional investors and asset managers currently inadequate: ‘there is 
clear evidence that the current level of ‘monitoring’ of investee companies and 
engagement by institutional investors and asset managers is often inadequate and 
focuses too much on short-term returns, which may lead to suboptimal corporate 
governance and performance’.5 Thereto, these shareholder types should publicly 
disclose information about the implementation of their engagement policy and 
in particular how they have exercised their voting rights. According to article 3g 
of the SRD II ‘the policy shall describe how they monitor investee companies 
on relevant matters, including strategy, financial and non-financial performance 
and risk, capital structure, social and environmental impact and corporate 
governance, conduct dialogues with investee companies, exercise voting 
rights and other rights attached to shares, cooperate with other shareholders, 
communicate with relevant stakeholders of the investee companies and manage 
actual and potential conflicts of interests in relation to their engagement.’
It is generally understood that the electronic casting of the votes prior to the 
general meeting became common practice for many shareholders. However, 
there is currently no insight as to how important this type of remote voting is 
and which shareholders commonly make use of this voting tool. Further, if it is 
found that voting in absentia is common practice, it raises questions as to how the 
cooperation with other shareholders, being part of the engagement policy can take 
place, as the general meeting can, in the case of this remote voting, no longer be 
considered as a platform for reflection and deliberation between the shareholders.
In the next sections I first address whether the SRD I has had effects on the 
voting turnouts. As it became easier and less expensive to vote at general meetings, 
it can be expected that voting turnouts increased after the transposition of the 
Directive in the different Member States. Next, I study the different voting modes 
that shareholders make use of. For this analysis we use a hand-collected database 
of data of French companies. In the last section I suggest that the different voting 
techniques and the request for more shareholder engagement that currently takes 
different forms, can be aligned with the use of modern technology.
2. VOTING TURNOUTS
An important aim of the SRD I was the abolishment of shareholder voting 
obstacles. All shareholders should be enabled to cast their votes in or before the 
general meeting of shareholders. Reducing corporate voting hindrances should 
have a positive effect on the voting turnouts of general meetings. As the costs of 
5 Ibid. Recital 2.
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voting diminishes, more shareholders will find it beneficial to participate in the 
voting process as their marginal benefits of voting will exceed the marginal cost 
of this voting.
Table 1 shows the development of the participation of shareholders in general 
meetings of index listed companies in nine European countries between 2007 
and 2017. These numbers include all voting mechanisms, like attending in 
person, voting by mail, proxy voting or any other mode.
Table 1: Average AGM Voting Turnouts of Companies of the National Major Index 
(2007-2017)
Belgium France Germany Italy Netherlands Spain Switzerland UK Mean
2007 45.4 53.5 58.3 49.1 43.4 69.4 43.5 62.0 53.1
2008 45.4 58.9 60.0 61.2 47.5 71.7 48.3 61.8 56.9
2009 48.6 63.7 57.7 59.6 47.9 72.6 51.0 64.5 58.2
2010 46.6 61.5 56.1 58.8 48.9 69.1 53.1 67.2 57.7
2011 46.9 64.7 56.5 58.1 72.2 55.4 69.0 60.4
2012 53.5 65.4 53.7 64.6 63.7 68.3 57.6 70.9 62.2
2013 57.0 65.7 49.9 65.2 62.7 66.2 60.5 71.0 62.3
2014 59.4 64.5 55.1 66.6 68.4 67.6 58.0 70.3 63.7
2015 62.7 65.3 54.9 65.1 70.4 67.8 64.2 71.8 65.3
2016 59.2 65.8 59.9 66.6 70.5 68.2 63.0 72.9 65.8
2017 65.7 65.4 60.0 66.5 72.1 71.7 66.7 73.4 67.7
Sources: Georgeson, Georgeson’s 2017 Proxy Season Review, 2017; Georgeson, Georgeson’s 
2016 Proxy Season Review, 2016; Georgeson, Georgeson’s 2014 Proxy Season Review, 2014; 
Georgeson, Georgeson’s 2014 Proxy Season Review UK & Europe, 2007; for specific years Belgium: 
own research; the Netherlands 2007-2009: Eumedion, Evaluatie AVA-seizoen 2010; Italy and 
Switzerland 2008-2010: ISS, Voting Results Report Europe 2010.
Table 1 shows that since 2007 the participation rates of shareholders significantly 
increased from 53 per cent in 2007 to 68 per cent in 2017. This development is not 
to be found equally in all countries. France experienced soaring participation 
rates at the end of the last decade. In Spain the average participation rate was 
already close to 70 per cent since 2007 and it remained stable over time. Germany 
had relatively high voting turnouts at the start and the end of the research period 
and lower turnouts in the middle. In Belgium and Switzerland a significantly 
higher number of shareholders were incentivised to vote. In both countries the 
average participation turnout increased with more than 20 per cent. A similar 
evolution is noticed in the Netherlands. While the participation was the lowest 
among the eight European countries in 2007, it soared to over 72 per cent in 
2017, the second highest turnout of all countries in this study. In the latter year, 
only shareholders in the UK showed more willingness to participate in general 
meetings.
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The data show that the transposition of the SRD I caused some increase in 
participation rates. I collected the transposition legislation of the European 
Member States in our sample. While most countries were late in transposing SRD 
I, almost all transposing legislations came into effect shortly after their enactment 
and the effects should be noticeable from 2011 onwards. Only in Germany and 
Belgium, companies had to comply with the new rules from 2010 and 2012 
onwards (table 2). In all countries but Germany the year after the transposition 
of the SRD I the participation rates increased. In two countries, the Netherlands 
and Belgium, this increase was – with 10 per cent and 6.5 per cent – the largest 
in the whole decade. The other countries show more modest increases of 2 to 4 
per cent. These findings confirm a previous study, making use of a difference-in-
difference estimation with companies from Belgium, the Netherlands and France 
and a control group from the UK. The results of this study confirmed the positive 
impact of the SRD I on the turnout rates of general meetings.6
Table 2. Transposition of the Shareholder Rights Directive I
Country Transposition SRD I Effect Noticeable from 
Belgium 20 December 2010 January 2012 2012
France 23 June 2010 October 2010 2011
Germany 30 July 2009 November 2009 2010
Italy 27 January 2010 October 2010 2011
The Netherlands 30 June 2010 July 2010 2011
Spain 2 July 2010 September 2010 2011
UK 2 July 2010 August 2010 2010/11
3. VOTING MODES
Whereas data on the evolution of the participation rates become more and 
more available, the voting mode that shareholders make use of is not frequently 
disclosed. In this section I investigate how the shareholders vote at the general 
meeting of shareholders and whether large and small shareholders make use of 
different voting techniques. In particular, I focus on the importance of electronic 
voting. This technique can affect the ways shareholders communicate with 
each other. For this study I made use of data that French companies disclose. 
French companies are among the few companies in Europe that publicly disclose 
this voting information. As far as I am aware no other study has empirically 
investigated the different voting modes shareholders make use of.
6 A. Lafarre, The AGM in Europe: Theory and Practice of Shareholder Behaviour, Emerald 
Publishing Limited, Bingley 2017, pp. 205-226.
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3.1. DATA COLLECTION
First, I hand-collected all documents related to the annual general meetings of 
companies that are part of the French SBF-120 index of Euronext in July 2018. 
This index consists of all companies included in the CAC Large 60, which 
includes the main CAC 40 index, and CAC Mid 60 indices. The SBF-120 includes 
9 companies with a statutory seat outside France which were excluded from the 
sample.7 Further, the merger between Lafarge and the Swiss Holcim created a 
group with its seat in Switzerland. Therefore, LafargeHolcim was also excluded 
from the study. Of the remaining 110 companies the available documents of all 
AGMs between 2011 and 2018 were collected and studied.
More precisely, I include in my sample those companies that not only 
disclose the voting turnouts and the results for each resolution but interpreted 
the following requirement in the transposed French rule extensively:
“Companies whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market publish 
on the website referred to in Article R. 210-20, within fifteen days of the meeting, 
the results of the votes including at least: 1° the number of shareholders present or 
represented at the meeting; 2° the number of votes of the shareholders present or 
represented at the meeting; 3° For each resolution, the total number of votes related 
to the number of shares and the proportion of the share capital they represent, the 
number and percentage of votes in favor of the resolution, the number and percentage 
of votes against the resolution, as well as the abstentions” (Article R225-106-1 French 
Commercial Code, own translation).
Those companies not only provided the results of the voting but also identified 
for each voting method the number of shareholders that made use of this voting 
method as well as the number of accompanying shares and votes. Table 3 
provides in an example of a disclosure document.
7 These companies are: 5 Dutch companies (Airbus, Aperam, Euronext, Gemalto and 
STMicrolelectronics), 2 Luxemburgish companies (ArcelorMittal and SES), 1 Belgian 
company (Solvay) and one UK company (TechnipFMC).
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Table 3. Example of the Participation Disclosures of the 2018 AGM of Sanofi
SANOFI
Assemblée Générale Mixte 02/05/2018
Nombre d’actions composant le capital: 1248988931
Nombre d’actions ayant le droit de participer au vote: 1247546965
Partie Ordinaire Nombre Actions Voix
Actionnaires Présents 1058 120163697 239025303
Pouvoirs au président 8180 3211424 5405423
Pouvoirs mandatés à des tiers 797 2671433 5090245
Votes par correspondance 6489 683772009 685096990
Total 16524 809818563 934617961
Quorum 64,91%
Source: Voting results 2018 Sanofi AGM (last accessed 27 October 2018)
This disclosure does not always provide information whether voting rights of 
shares have been suspended, which is the case for the treasury shares. Neither 
is disclosed the total number of votes attached to the shares. While the total 
number of issued shares is reported as well as how many shares of participating 
shareholders have double voting rights, the double voting rights attached to non-
participating shareholders is often not divulged. Thereto I also consulted the 
monthly disclosure document that a listed company must publish in accordance 
with Article L 233-8-II of the Commercial Code and Article 223-16 of the general 
regulation of the French supervisory authority AMF in which the total number 
of voting rights and the total number of shares are disclosed.8
Third, I also identified whether the companies have a controlling shareholder 
or controlling group and if so how many shares and votes this controlling 
shareholder holds. This information is disclosed in a dedicated section in the 
annual registration document9 and in the document of passing a voting or 
capital threshold10 as identified in Article L. 233-7 of the Commercial Code.
In total 40 companies divulge all these data for one or more years and 15 
companies provided all data for all years.11 Especially in more recent years, more 
companies provide in details which voting methods the shareholders have used.
8 For the example of Sanofi, see https://www.sanofi.com/fr/investisseurs/action-sanofi-et-adrs/
action-sanofi/droits-de-vote-et-actions (last consulted 18 March 2019).
9 ‘Document de Référence’.
10 ‘Déclaration de franchissement de seuil’.
11 Pernod Ricard not included. This company also disclosed all data but the general meeting 
2018 of Pernod Ricard has not yet taken place at the moment of finalizing this study. Annex 1 
gives an overview of the companies that disclosed the data, companies in italic provided the 
data for all years in the sample.
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3.2. SHAREHOLDERS AND VOTING MODES12
First I analysed how many shareholders participate in a general meeting. In 
2011 the average number of shareholders voting at the general meeting of large 
French companies was over 6,500 (Figure 1). Th is number dropped over time. 
In 2018 the average number was 5,500 shareholders. Th e median number of 
participating shareholders is signifi cantly lower with 2,300 participants in 2011, 
decreasing to 1,600 in 2016 and soaring to close to 2,000 in 2018. At the meetings 
of Michelin more than 30,000 shareholders participated between 2011 and 2016 
aft er which Total took over as with the most frequented meetings with over 
40,000 participants in 2017 and 28,000 in 2018. It is not uncommon for French 
companies to welcome votes of more than 10,000 shareholders. Conversely, at 
some meetings of these large companies, only 50 shareholders participated.
Figure 1. Evolution of the number of participating shareholders at AGMs of French 
companies (2011-2018)
Figure 2 divides the participating shareholders in the four classes according to 
their voting mode: shareholders that attend the general meeting in person, those 
that are represented by a third party, shareholders that provided a proxy to the 
chairman and shareholders that have send their votes by mail.
Th e fi rst group is in steady decline. While the relative number of these 
shareholders was close to 20 per cent in 2011 and 2012, in 2018 less than 7 per 
cent of the shareholders were present in personam at the meeting. In absolute 
numbers, the average number of attending shareholders dropped from 583 
shareholders in 2011 to 371 shareholders in 2018. During the research period 
12 Th is part is partially based on C. Van der Elst, ‘Attending at the General Meeting or Voting 
by Mail: Th e French Case’ [2018] 4, RTDF, pp. 61-67.
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the median of attending shareholders dropped from 350 shareholders to 120 
shareholders. An absolute low in the number of attending shareholders was 
found at the 2018 general meeting of Maison du Monde: 2 shareholders were 
present with a total number of 1,004 shares, representing 0.003 per cent of all 
participating votes. Meetings where only 10 to 20 shareholders are attending in 
person are not uncommon.
Authorising a proxy to participate on behalf of a shareholder at the general 
meeting is not common practice. Only 5 per cent of the shareholders made use of 
a proxy at the meeting in 2011 and this number dropped to less than 0.5 per cent 
in 2017, with a limited revival of this mechanism in 2018 when 1.5 per cent of the 
shareholders used a proxy.
A far more common technique that shareholders of French companies use, 
is providing a power of attorney to the chairman of the general meeting, who is 
commonly the chairman of the (supervisory) board of directors. Between 27 per 
cent (2012) and 34 per cent (2018) of the shareholders empowered the chairman 
of the board to vote their shares at the general meeting.
Figure 2. Evolution of the use of diff erent voting modes of AGM participating 
shareholders of French companies (2011-2018)
Th e most common technique for participating in the general meeting of 
shareholders is remote voting or voting by mail. Since 2012 over 50 per cent 
of all shareholders participate in the general meeting of shareholders “from a 
distance”. Th is number stabilised around 58 per cent between 2016 and 2018. 
However, the higher average participation via proxy by mail compared to the 
proxy for the chairman is due to the absence of the use of the latter mode in a 
number of companies.
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3.3. VOTING RIGHTS AND VOTING MODES13
Th e former analysis of the diff erent voting modes used by the individual 
shareholders is not taking into account the diff erent number of shares and voting 
rights these shareholders hold. With the disclosure of the number of voting 
rights and shares for each of the diff erent voting modes, also the preference of 
the shareholders with diff erent voting blocks can be studied.
Figure 3 introduces the fi ndings with an overview of the total number of 
voting rights that were participating in the voting process. Overall, both the 
median as well as the average attendance of shareholders calculated in terms 
of their voting stakes remained stable over time and varied between 72 per 
cent and 76 per cent. As the number of participating shareholders dropped, the 
average voting block of participating shareholders increased moderately. Overall 
the companies in my sample have a higher voting turnout than the CAC-40 
companies in the Georgeson studies (see section 2) that have an average voting 
turnout of 65 per cent.
Figure 3. Evolution of the voting turnout of the participating shareholders of French 
companies (2011-2018)
Figure 4 shows that two modes measured by voting turnout are common: 
shareholders that attend in person and vote at the meeting and shareholders that 
vote by mail. Th e two other techniques, making use of a power of attorney for 
the chairman of the general meeting or being represented at the meeting are, if 
measured by the number of voting rights, little used.
13 Th is part is based on C. Van der Elst, ‘Attending at the General Meeting or Voting by Mail: 
Th e French Case’ [2018] 4, RTDF, pp. 61-67.
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First, remote voting gains importance over time. While only 43 per cent of 
all the votes were voted through the channel of mail voting, this percentage 
increased to 57 in 2018, similar to the average number of shareholders that 
make use of this voting mode (Figure 2). However, the annual average of 
voting by mail, which is almost equal to the median per cent, covers significant 
differences at company level. At the start of the research period shareholders 
of some companies did not make use of voting by mail at all. Towards the end 
of the research period there were no longer companies without shareholder 
voting by mail although even then some companies disclosed that only 5 
per cent of all the votes were received by mail. Conversely, already in 2011, 
in some companies all important shareholders were participating at the 
meeting by voting by mail and this voting mode is sometimes standing for 
over 95 per cent of all the votes participating in those meetings. In 2011 half 
of the companies received more than half of the votes by mail, in 2018 this 
number soared to two thirds of the companies and in close to 20 per cent of 
the companies, voting by mail stands for more than 90 per cent of the voting 
turnout. Most companies with very low levels of voting by mail are companies 
with a (large) majority shareholder that attends in personam the general 
meeting of shareholders.
Second, the number of voting rights of shareholders attending the meeting 
in person is decreasing steadily. Standing for more than 50 per cent of all the 
voting rights participating in the meeting in 2011, the attending shareholders 
voted on average only 35 per cent of the participating votes in 2018, the median 
percentage even dropped to 22 per cent of all participating votes. Companies 
with a controlling shareholder heavily influenced these levels, as all those 
companies had shareholders attending in personam that were voting with close 
to 90 per cent or more of all participating voting rights.
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Figure 4. Evolution of the relative importance of the diff erent voting modes in French 
companies (2011-2018)
Th e numbers show that the shareholders that make use of the proxy to the 
chairman are commonly very small shareholders. With a median of 450 to 
1,100 shareholders making use of this voting mechanism, the total voting 
turnout of this mode stand for 1.7 to 7.2 per cent of the participating votes in 
the meeting. In 2017, when the approximately 3,300 shareholders provided this 
power of attorney to the chairman, their votes counted for 1.7 per cent of all the 
participating votes. Proxies to other participants are negligible in size. Less than 
2 per cent of the voting turnout fl ows from this voting technique.
3.4. VOTING MODES OF CONTROLLING, LARGE AND 
SMALL SHAREHOLDERS
For 2018, I combined the ownership data with the number of shareholders 
and the diff erent types of voting modes that shareholders make use of. 31 
companies disclosed the diff erent voting modes and the number of participating 
shareholders per voting mode in 2018. Of this group of companies, eleven 
companies were controlled by the largest shareholder. Th e average voting block 
of this group of controlling shareholders was 70.3 per cent, the average share 
block 59.2 per cent. Only two of these companies apply the one share one vote 
rule. One of these companies had a shareholder with a controlling minority 
voting block of 40 per cent, while all other controlling shareholders hold both a 
majority share and a majority voting block.
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3.4.1. Methodology
As these controlling shareholders hold more than half of the voting rights 
attached to the attending shares, it is possible to deduct from the data of the 
different modes of voting, which voting mode the controlling shareholders made 
use of. An example can illustrate this deductive method. Suppose that a company 
has issued 100 shares of which 50 have double voting rights (hence there are 150 
votes in total) and the controlling shareholder owns 55 shares of which 35 have 
double voting rights, ie she controls 90 votes (60 per cent of all the votes). At 
the general meeting 110 votes are ‘participating’, belonging to 3 shareholders 
that attend in person with 60 shares and 95 voting rights and 2 shareholders 
vote by mail their 12 shares with 15 votes. It follows from these data that a) the 
controlling shareholder is participating and b) this shareholder attends in person 
(with most likely all her shares).
Next, I deducted for companies with a controlling shareholder the number of 
votes of this shareholder from the total number of votes of the according voting 
mode this shareholder made use of. From the data result that the controlling 
shareholder almost always attend the meeting in person. I also deducted its votes 
from the total number of participating votes at the general meeting. Further, 
I divided the total number of participating votes by the total number of the 
participating shareholders (excluding the controlling shareholders). Similarly, for 
each voting mode I divided the number of votes by the number of participating 
shareholders. The results of each voting mode are compared with the average 
voting block of each participating shareholder. We illustrate this process using 
the aforementioned example. Next to the controlling shareholder there are 4 
other shareholders participating in the general meeting, 2 shareholders attend 
in person holding together 5 shares with 5 votes (resulting with the controlling 
shareholder in an attendance in personam of 60 shares and 95 votes) and 2 
shareholders that vote by mail their 12 shares and 15 votes. It results from these 
presumptions that the average voting block of the non-controlling shareholders 
is 5 votes ((5+15)/4), the average voting block of the shareholders attending in 
person is 2.5 votes (which equals to 50 per cent of the overall average voting 
block of 5 votes) and the average voting block of the shareholders voting by mail 
is 7,5 votes (which equals to 150 per cent of the overall average voting block of 5 
votes). The overall attendance of the non-controlling shareholders is 33 per cent 
(20 votes of a total of 60 votes belonging to the non-controlling shareholders) of 
which 25 per cent is voted by shareholders attending the meeting (5 votes) and 75 
per cent was voted by mail (15 votes).
Similarly, I calculated all these outcomes for shareholders participating in the 
general meeting of 2018 of French companies in this sample. Figure 5 (below) 
is presenting the relative median result of each of the voting modes for all 
companies as well as the median results of both groups of companies, the group 
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of controlled companies and the group of companies without a controlling 
shareholder.14 I discuss the major findings next.
3.4.2. Voting modes of controlling shareholders
The data show that it is common practice that these controlling shareholders 
attend the meeting in person. Only two controlling shareholders provided 
a proxy to the chairman of meeting. In one case the majority shareholder 
is a subsidiary of a Belgian holding company, in the other case the majority 
shareholder is itself indirectly controlled by a family. The chairman of the 
listed company is a family member. In a third company, the two concerting and 
controlling shareholders used different modes to participate in the meeting. One 
shareholder attended the meeting in person whilst the second shareholder voted 
by mail.
3.4.3. Voting modes of other shareholders
Figure 5 presents the results of the median voting block of each of the voting 
modes relative to the average voting block of each participating shareholder. The 
first part of figure 5 presents the results for all shareholders participating in the 
meeting. The median voting block of the shareholders using the remote voting 
tool is the largest and almost 60 per cent larger than the median voting block 
of all participating shareholders. Shareholders that vote remotely are the larger 
shareholders, more than likely institutional shareholders. The median value of 
the number of shares of shareholders making use of electronic voting is close to 
the average value of 163 per cent and the standard deviation is low. It provides 
evidence that a large number of the envisaged shareholders hold a comparable 
voting block.
Next, also shareholders that attend in person the general meeting have 
a voting block that is 22 per cent larger than the median voting block of all 
participating shareholders. Contrary to the voting blocks of shareholders making 
use of remote voting, shareholders attending in person differ substantially from 
each other: the average voting block of this shareholder is over 220 per cent of 
the average voting block of all participating shareholders. Both a number of 
larger shareholders as well as a larger number of the small shareholders attend 
the general meeting in person.
From the foregoing follows that the two other voting modes attract 
shareholders with small to very small voting blocks. The median voting block 
of shareholders that proxy the chairman is only 6 per cent of the overall median, 
the shareholders that make use of another proxyholder is less than 0.5 per cent. 
14 In the previous example, there are next to the controlling shareholder, 4 shareholders 
participating,
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Only a limited number of larger shareholders make use of both instruments: the 
average proxy to the chairman is 21 per cent, the average of another proxyholder 
is 3 per cent, a multiple of the median value.
The results for the group of companies with a controlling shareholder 
and the group of uncontrolled companies show a significant difference 
for shareholders attending the meeting in person. Next to the controlling 
shareholder attending in person, the other shareholders attending the 
meeting have only very small voting blocks: the median voting block of this 
kind of shareholders is only 9 per cent of the median voting block of all the 
participating shareholders. It should be noted that there are still some larger 
shareholders in controlled companies that prefer to attend in person. The 
average voting block is almost twice the size of the overall average voting block 
of participating shareholders in this group of companies. This result is due to 
the participation of a very limited number of other blockholders, next to the 
controlling shareholder.
In the group of the uncontrolled companies the median voting block of 
shareholders attending in person of 176 per cent is much larger than the overall 
average voting block (and an even higher average of 240 per cent). Shareholders 
with larger voting blocks, of which a number have been disclosed according 
to the transparency rules, prefer to attend in person in companies without a 
controlling shareholder.
In the latter group of uncontrolled companies the largest median voting 
block of participating shareholders belongs to the shareholders that vote by mail. 
This is even more outspoken the case in the group of the controlled companies 
where at meetings the median voting block of the shareholders making use of 
another voting mode is very moderate to negligible. Further, in the former group 
of uncontrolled companies, the median voting block of shareholders voting by 
mail is significantly larger than the median voting block of shareholders that 
vote by mail in controlled companies.
Overall these findings make it possible to differentiate three groups of 
shareholders that make use of different voting modes. The first group are the 
large and controlling shareholders. Those shareholders have the common 
practice to attend the meeting in person. Next, a large group of shareholders 
with significant voting blocks participate in the meeting through the 
mechanism of remote voting. Most likely, although it does not follow from 
my data in this study, it includes the group of the institutional investors. 
The third group, are small to very small shareholders, more than likely retail 
shareholders that combine different voting techniques: some attend the 
meeting in person, others provide in a proxy to the chairman, sometimes 
and only the very small shareholders authorise another person to vote at the 
meeting.
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Figure 5. Median voting block of each of the voting modes relative to the average 
voting block of each participating shareholder in controlled (excluding the controlling 
shareholder) and uncontrolled French companies (2018)
Note: the represented shareholders are not presented in the fi gure as the results are close to 0 per cent.
4. CORPORATE VOTING MODES, THE AGM AS 
PLATFORM FOR ENGAGEMENT AND NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES
In the fi rst section, I referred to the European requirement for institutional 
investors and the asset managers to develop an engagement policy with 
information on how these shareholders monitor their investees, exercise their 
voting rights and conduct dialogues with companies and cooperate with other 
shareholders.
In the previous sections, I provide evidence that remote voting became the 
current technique for voting. More than half of the votes are from shareholders 
that vote in absentia. While the largest shareholders seem to be participating 
and voting in personam, large shareholders, most likely institutional investors, 
make use of the technique of remote voting. Th ese remote votes matter. A recent 
Dutch case illustrates this fi nding. When the board of directors of Unilever 
announced its proposal to simplify the corporate structure and locate its 
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headquarters in Rotterdam, the board cancelled the general meeting between 
the date of the notice of the meeting and the date of the meeting.15 It is not 
unlikely that the company received sufficient ‘remote votes’ to notice that it was 
unlikely that the resolution would have passed. Consequently, the technique 
erodes the ‘forum function’ of the “physical” general meeting of shareholders 
as the place where presentations by the board are followed by a fruitful debate 
and discussion with the shareholders helping to further form their opinion 
before issuing an informed vote. It comes on top of the current platforms that 
companies and shareholders already make use of, like telephone calls, e-mails, 
in person discussions, exchange of letters to inform, communicate, discuss and 
deliberate.16 It raises questions as to which instruments the shareholders, and 
in particular the institutional investors and asset managers will make use to 
comply with the new requirements in the Shareholder Rights Directive.
I believe that this fragmented approach of voting, cooperating and 
conducting dialogues leads to suboptimal results and both companies as well as 
shareholders could easily miss relevant information. However, returning to the 
old style general meetings with shareholders participating in personam cannot 
reasonably be expected as the way forward in modern times. Thereto, new 
technological developments should be considered for shareholder engagement. 
Distributed ledger technology, like blockchain, is certainly one avenue that 
deserves further study to serve as an alternative tool for the development of the 
voting and communication process in an accessible, open and transparent way. 
In a private blockchain, managed by the company or another ‘ ‘administrator’ 
only accessible for shareholders, the company and shareholders that hold 
sufficient shares can place proposals and all shareholders can communicate and 
cooperate with each other. It can replace many functions of the general meeting 
of shareholders.17
15 A. Mooney, ‘Unilever must learn to listen to mood music’ [15 October 2018], Financial Times 
FTfm, 8.
16 For an analysis of the use of these communication techniques see J. McCahery, Z. Sautner 
and L. Starks, ‘Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional 
Investors’ [2016], Journal of Finance, 2905-2932.
17 C. Van der Elst and A. Lafarre, ‘Blockchain and Smart Contracting for the Shareholder 
Community’ [2019] 20 European Business Organization law Review 1, 111-137; A. Lafarre 
and C. Van der Elst, ‘Legal Tech and Blockchain for Corporate Governance and 
Shareholders’, in Research Handbook on Data Science and Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 
2018, 153-181; C. Van der Elst and A. Lafarre, ‘Blockchain and the 21st Century Annual 
General Meeting’ [2017] 14 European Company Law 4, 167-176.
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ANNEX 1. FRENCH COMPANIES IN THE SAMPLE
Accor DBV Technologies Maison du Monde Saint Gobain
Altran Techn. EDF Michelin Sanofi
Amundi Elior Nexans Sartorius Sted Bio
Arkema Elis Orange Schneider Electric
Atos Eutelsat Pernod-Ricard Tarkett
Biomérieux GTT Plastic Omnium Thales
BNP Paribas Iliad Renault Total
Bouygues Imerys Rexel Unibail Rodamco
Cap Gemini Legrand Rubis Veolia
Dassault Aviation LVMH Safran Worldline
Companies in italic provided all data over the period of study.

